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ABSTRACT 
 
High oleic soybeans (HOS) are soybeans recently developed to improve the 
fatty acid profile of soybeans oils in order to make them healthier for human 
consumption and more cost effective to process.  HOS need to be segregated from 
commodity grain at the farm and through the rest of the food chain so that high oleic 
soybeans and oils do not get commingled with their bulk counterpart. Production at 
the farm is typically governed by contractual arrangements between farmers and 
buyers of HOS to make certain that famers implement adequate segregation 
measures during production, storage and transportation. 
 A few of this high oleic soybean programs have been put in place last years 
in restricted location of the United Stated Midwest. These programs are likely to 
expend in the future, but little is currently known about the constraint and factors 
influencing farmers’ participation HOS programs. The aim of thesis is to provide 
information about grower preferences for the key contracts attributes used in 
governing the production of HOS soybeans.  These attributes are premium levels, 
delivery windows, distance to buyer, thresholds and HOS brand names.   
The methodology consisted of a choice experiment survey administered to a 
random sample of growers over the internet. Results indicated that premium levels, 
delivery options and the distance to buyer are attributes that significantly influence 
growers’ willingness to participate in HOS programs.  In particular, growers are 
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willing-to-accept (WTA) about $0.12/bushel less of a premium if a harvest delivery 
(HD) option rather than a buyer’s call (BC) delivery option is given.
1 
1. Introduction 
 
Contract arrangements for the production of high oleic soybeans (HOS) are 
likely to play a significant role in the adoption of these varieties of soybeans. Indeed, 
contracts allocate the value share, decision rights and uncertainties linked to the 
transaction between buyer and seller of specialty crops (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003). 
Contracts have been used extensively in agriculture either as simple arrangements 
to specify the grades and prices  for spot marketing (Goldsmith, 2004) or for more 
elaborate transactions for which marketing contracts are typically used. 
James, Klein, & Sykuta (2011) classify marketing contracts as agreements 
where production practices are decided upon by the growers.  Marketing contracts 
are therefore contracts that are typically used for the production of specialty crops 
which often require some degree of control by the buyers over production.  
Transactions involving row crops comprised the largest share (roughly 66 percent) 
of agricultural marketing contracts in 2008 (MacDonald & Korb, 2008) and  in 2005 
approximately 22 percent of total agricultural production was traded through the 
use of marketing contracts (MacDonald & Korb, 2008).  These contracts nearly 
always contain a delivery schedule, a delivery location, quantity and pricing terms.  
Crop segregation programs, such as HOS program, involve commodities that  
do not display a high degree of differentiation and do not need to be strictly identity 
preserved as would be the case for non genetically modified (NGM) crops. As a 
result, contracts used for these programs typically do not specify a set of steps or 
tasks that producers would have to comply to during the planting and growing 
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season. However, they often specify a certain level of purity threshold that must be 
maintained, i.e. the maximum percentage of contamination from unlike crops which 
a batch of segregated/identity preserved (IP) grain may contain.  
The contracts that are used for HOS segregation programs specify the seed 
varieties to be planted, the delivery option, premiums per bushel, other pricing 
terms, contingencies, threshold/IP requirements, and delivery location.  An 
incentive premium is given to offset additional segregation costs growers may incur 
because of the constraints associated with participating in the segregation program.  
Many costs must indeed be incurred by grower participating in these programs 
because the contract attributes constrain farm management practices.  
 Additional segregation costs are also incurred by different parties across the 
corresponding supply chain, however, the segment of the overall HOS supply chain 
relevant for this thesis consists of only three steps.  The first step in the segment of 
the HOS supply chain analyzed in this thesis consists of the farm and fields of the 
growers participating in the program.  Second, at some time after harvest the crop is 
supplied to an intermediary buyer.  Third, HOS batches are sent to a soybean 
processing (crushing) facility where HOS oil is extracted.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
chain and the following section characterizes additional segregation costs which 
participants may encounter.     
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Map 1 Basic HOS Supply Chain  
 
A. Segregation Costs at Processes of the HOS Supply Chain 
 
Segregation costs are additional costs that growers realize when 
participating in a segregation program.  The different segregation costs that growers 
much incur during the growing season can be classified into different categories.  
The first category consists of coordination cost and includes searching and 
bargaining costs as well as contract construction costs.  Coordination costs have 
been depicted as beginning before planting and accruing until the end user takes 
possession of the crop (Maltsbarger & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).  The second 
category consists of the monitoring costs which begin shortly after a grower has 
chosen to participate in a program.  The monitoring costs are related to the amount 
of labor necessary to determine whether segregation responsibilities are being 
upheld by the grower. The third type of segregation costs are extra cleaning costs as 
the growers and the buyers are expected to keep equipment clean.  Maltsbarger & 
Kalaitzandonakes (2001) note that extra cleaning of equipment – e.g. tractors, 
trucks and on-farm capacity – has to be thoroughly done by growers to prevent co-
mingling of segregated crops with bulk commodities.  The last category of 
Farmers field Intermediary Buyer 
i.e. Grain Elevator 
Soybean 
Processing 
(Crushing) Facility 
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segregation costs consists of the opportunity costs which are only incurred 
indirectly by growers.  For example, growers are sometimes compelled to plant a 
buffer zone around in the fields whose crop has been contracted. A buffer zone is 
land required to be used (or idled) in a pre-determined way to prevent cross 
pollination.  Not all segregation programs require buffer zones.  But those that do 
limit the number of cropland management opportunities a grower may choose to 
undertake while utilizing his/her land resources for utility maximization and 
therefore costs are only incurred indirectly. 
After harvest a grower transports grain to the first point of delivery (FPD) 
which is often dictated by a program attribute indicating the type of delivery option 
(Maltsbarger, 1999).  If the FPD is the growers own capacity, as in a scenario 
characterized by a buyers call (BC) delivery option, the farm business incurs a 
storage cost of about $0.03/bushel/month (Thakur & Hurburgh, 2009).  The BC 
delivery option implies the transaction and physical movement of grain from 
grower to buyer will not occur until a specified timeframe months after soybean 
harvest.  During this timeframe (ex: Feb-March 2015) the buyer will call in the 
grower to deliver the crop.  In this BC scenario, if a grower would have preferred to 
deliver grain to a buyer immediately after harvest (as is implied by the harvest 
delivery option) then the additional travel distance, storage cost and any other 
opportunity costs should also be counted as segregation cost. 
Batches of segregated grain eventually travel to an intermediary buyer 
where additional costs may eventually be incurred by both the growers and the 
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buyers. Batches are typically tested for purity when buyers receive the crops so a 
fixed cost must be allocated to pay for the testing devices or machines. Variable 
costs must also be incurred if individual testing kit is used and time must be spent to 
administer the tests (Wilson, Henry, & Dahl, 2008).  Tests may not output accurate 
information and in this situation misreading costs are accrued to both the grower 
and the buyer which in essence reduces the  transaction efficiency (Gloy & Dooley, 
2003).   If segregated crop batches do not pass threshold tests, growers incur some 
cost because they either are paid a discounted price or have to use additional fuel 
for delivery elsewhere.   
If a batch of grain has passed across a buyers scale it will travel to a pit where 
it is unloaded.  Grain bins contain “dump pits, boots, legs, dryers, conveyor belts and 
spouts” (Bullock & Desquilbet, 2002) which must all be cleaned before the delivery 
of the specialty crop.  Additional storage capacity may have to be build or entire 
dedicated storage facility may have to be used for very stringent purity thresholds. 
Other opportunity costs are relevant for buyer (Maltsbarger, 1999).  Elevator 
makes most of their money by holding grain or rotating grain as often as possible 
through storage capacity.  However, participation in a segregation program may 
reduce the utilization of the storage capacity when specific bins have to be allocated 
to segregated crops.  This is a potential cost if not planned for accordingly because it 
implies than normal operations cannot be ran as efficiently (Maltsbarger & 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).   
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Quantity terms manage yield uncertainty and allow buyers to better predict 
the amount of in-coming bushels of a segregated crop to expect (Sykuta & Parcell, 
2003).  The terms depict a specific yield or the entire yield from a specified number 
of acres to be delivered to buyer (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003).  When a precise yield is 
agreed upon an ex-ante production level is set.  Yield contracts allocate risk to 
growers (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003) because growers will have to buy and deliver 
additional production if they are short on yield.  An acreage term is where 100 
percent of the yield from a specified number of acres (ex: 100 acres) is to be 
transacted.  Compared to yield contracts, less risk is allocated to a grower when an 
acreage contract is agreed upon by a grower and a buyer (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003) 
because producers will not have to take remedy actions if they are short on yield. 
The third and final process comprising the supply chain being studied is the 
soybean crushing facility. Crushers receive many batches of soybeans, which are 
then processed into separate byproducts like soybean oil and meal.  Additional 
value these facilities collect from HOS oil transactions needs to be re-allocated back 
upstream to growers as incentive for planting HOS varieties.  The following section 
details supply and demand of soybean oil.    
B. Supply and Demand of Soybean Oil 
 
Soybeans account for nearly 90% of oilseed production in the United States 
("Soybeans & Oil Crops Overview," 2012).  Approximately 85% of the soybean 
production around the world is crushed into soybean oil and meal, which are 
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separate byproducts used to meet various demands ("Soy Facts," 2014).  Soybean 
oils account for the largest share (approx. 60%) of edible vegetable oils consumed in 
the United States ("Soybean Oil Uses & Overview," 2014).   
Soybean oils are used extensively for food and industrial purposes.  About 
95% of soybean oil consumed is in the form of human food products ("Soy Facts," 
2014).  Soybean oil is used in salad dressings, baked goods, crackers, barbecue 
sauces, various shortenings, imitation dairy products, potato chips, mayonnaise, 
breads and whipped creams (Cahoon, 2003).  The remaining 5% of total 
consumption is used for industrial purposes; including, inks, paints, varnishes, 
resins, plastics, animal feeds, automotive oils, other lubricants (not including 
automotive oils) and biodiesels (Cahoon, 2003).    
Figure 1 depicts the total supply and the total disappearance of soybean oil.  
The market for soybean oil is highly efficient and the total supply (blue line) and the 
total disappearance (red line) trends move together over time.  The total supply 
(blue line) of soybean oil grew from 12,480 million pounds in 1980 to 21,625 
million pounds in 2013.  The 2006 supply level was 23,536 million pounds.  The 
difference between the 2006 and 2013 total supply levels was -1,911 million 
pounds.  The total disappearance of soybean oil increased from 10,744 million 
pounds in 1980 to 20,050 million pounds in 2013.  In 2006 the total disappearance 
of soybean oil was 19,649 million pounds.  The difference between the 2006 and 
2013 total disappearance levels was -401 million pounds.  These decreased levels of 
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both the total supply and the total disappearance of soybean oil, since 20061, is a 
problem this thesis is designed to address by researching how best to get HOS 
programs adopted by the soybean growers.   
Figure 1: Soybean Oil Trends Prior To and After 2006 Trans Fats Regulation 
 
  Source: (USDA, 2014) 
 
Approximately 85% of soybean oil in any given year undergoes 
hydrogenation, which is an industrial process aimed at improving the oxidative 
stability of oils when they are heated but causes trans fats which are detrimental for 
human health ("Soy Facts," 2014).  Prior to hydrogenation, a batch of soybean oil is a 
hydrocarbon structure with many carbon double bonds (C=C).  During 
hydrogenation, gaseous hydrogen H is applied across oil sources, the outcome being 
more C-H bonds and fewer C=C.  Partial hydrogenation of soybean oil occurs when 
not all the carbon double bonds comprising the hydrocarbon structure turn into a C-
H connection.  Partial hydrogenation is the cause of trans fats, which have been 
                                                          
1
 See: Chapter 1. Section C “Trans fats and Demand Implications for Commodity Soybeans” for more 
information about the 2006 trans fats labeling law, which has influenced supply of soybean oil.   
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recently regulated and a decreased rate of soybean oil consumption has occurred 
since 2006.   
C. Trans fats and Demand Implications for Commodity 
Soybeans  
 
In 1999 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed regulation of 
trans fats.   The organization estimated that the required labeling of trans fatty acids 
would result in between 600 to 1,200 fewer cases of coronary heart disease per 
year, between 240 to 480 fewer human deaths a year and between $900 million to 
1,800 million savings in medical expenses each year (Moss, 2006).  Regulatory 
policy eventually passed in January 2006 at the federal level and mandatory labeling 
of trans fats became a requirement of food manufacturers, bakeries and foodservice 
providers.  The 2006 regulation states that foods must contain fewer than 0.5 grams 
of trans fats in order to be considered or labeled “0 grams Trans Fat.”  Commodity 
soybean oil cannot be labeled with this statement when they have been partially 
hydrogenated. 
Since 2006 more local US governments and international nations have 
imposed stricter regulation of trans fats; for instance, New York City and 
Philadelphia are both cities that have banned trans fats consumption in restaurants.  
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Switzerland, and the European Union 
countries have trans fats regulation and several of these nations outlaw its 
consumption.  One reason why supply and total disappearance trends for 
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commodity soybean oils have been declining is most likely because of the trans fats 
regulation.   
D. Benefits of HOS/HOS oil  
High oleic soybean varieties were genetically engineered to produce 
healthier oil than commodity soybeans. High oleic soybean varieties produce oil 
allowing for benefits similar to those received from commodity soybean oil but do 
not need to undergo the hydrogenation process to preserve its stability.  HOS oil is 
trans fats free and it reduces marketing and health problems coupled with 
commodity soybean oils and hydrogenated soybean oils.  HOS oil can be labeled 
with “0 grams Trans-fat,” the oil has the lowest amounts of saturated fat compared 
to any commodity soybean oil, it has great heat and oxidative stability and is heart 
healthy.  These facts show how negative health effects caused by consumption of 
hydrogenated commodity soybean oils are reduced by production of HOS oil.  
Furthermore, HOS oil displays great stability when heated.   
Commodity soybeans and HOS’s contain different levels and combinations of 
fatty acids.  Two types of fatty acids are oleic and linoleic acids.  Oleic acid is 
healthier than linoleic acid.  Regular commodity soybean varieties consist of 
approximately 20% oleic acid and 55% linoleic acid, but this differs across soybean 
varieties and soybean breeders exploited this variation in the late 1990s.  Soybean 
breeders selected varieties producing high levels of oleic acid and low levels of 
linoleic acid and reproduced them over generations until a desired outcome of 
about 75% oleic acid and 3% linoleic acid content was achieved in the mid-1990s.  
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However, these high oleic soybean (HOS) varieties were not adopted by growers 
because of a significant yield drag.  A few biotechnology companies invested in 
research project to address this low yield problem and this resulted in development 
of biotech soybean varieties allowing HOS’s to yield comparably with conventional 
soybean varieties (approximately 50 bushels/acre).   
Map 2 The Geography of High Oleic Soybeans 
 
 
Currently, HOS varieties are being marketed as branded seed and are grown 
in Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and a small geographical area in Maryland, as depicted by 
Map 2.  The geography that is colored red on Map 2 gives an understanding of where 
HOS production acreage may have been, during the 2014-15 growing season.  There 
is one buyer in Salisbury, Maryland and so the corresponding amount of red color 
can be used as an approximate scale.  Soybeans are grown in about thirty states but 
HOS were planted in less than five during the 2014-15 growing season. 
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Plenish® is the brand name for Pioneer-DuPont’s HOS lineup and Vistive 
Gold® is Monsanto Company’s brand name for its HOS varieties.  HOS yield the 
same when compared with conventional soybean varieties in the field and upon oil 
extraction.  Any soybean type consists of about 19-20% oil.  A bushel of soybeans 
weighs 60 pounds (lbs), so a bushel of soybeans yields about 12 lbs of oil. 
E. Contract Construction and Adoption Problems 
 
HOS oil may solve some problems encountered with commodity soybean oil, 
but its production implies contractual and participation issues.  Growers currently 
not participating in a program will need to change some of their management 
practices to incorporate HOS varieties into their crop rotations.  These changes can 
be inferred from the requirements imposed by HOS segregation programs as shown 
in Table 1 on the following page.   
Contractual requirements can be classified into six different types of 
attributes.  The first one called “Details and Requirements of the Contract” contains 
attributes important to the discussion.    Threshold requirements are required 
through the use of the phrase identity preserved acreage contract.  The premium 
level is another attribute found in the category.  Also, the delivery option is detailed 
as the agreement for buyer’s call, which forces a grower to maintain property rights 
of HOS’s until a specified timeframe; for example, Feb-March 2014.  This timeframe 
is found in the second category “Marketing/Delivery Options Stated.”  The category 
known as “High Oleic Soybean varieties to Plant” includes HOS brands and specific 
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seed types available upon participation in a program.  The last two categories 
contain contact information about the buyer and the seed provider.  A grower may 
use this information to determine a field’s distance to buyer.  Various levels of these 
attributes can be found across the HOS programs that are currently implemented.   
Table 1 Example HOS Program 
Category of Attributes Program Attributes 
A. Details and 
Requirements of the 
Contract 
1. Identity preserved acreage contract with (SEED PROVIDER) and 
delivery to (BUYER). See separate document for IP details. 
2. First-point delivery (ex: On-Farm storage). 
3. (SEED PROVIDERS) high oleic soybeans must be identity preserved. 
4. Premium level (ex: $.50/bushel) for On-Farm storage because of 
buyers call (BC) delivery. 
B. Marketing/Delivery 
Options Stated 
1. Delivery option (ex: Buyers call (BC)). 
2. Delivery to (Buyer) is BC from Feb-March 2014. 
3. Grain supply contract between BUYER and GROWER with Premium 
level paid upon settlement. 
C. Soybean Quality 
Characteristics 
1. Standard discounts and delivery parameters for crop quality and 
moisture upon delivery. 
2. Moisture Content (ex: 15% maximum) 
D. High Oleic Soybean  
varieties to Plant 
1. Branded HOS variety A with (RR) and (Y) traits.  Note this is an ex.. 
2. Branded HOS variety B with (RR) and (Y) and (X) traits.  Note also ex.. 
3. Branded HOS variety C with (RR) and (Z) and (Y) traits.  Note also ex.. 
E. Buyers Contact Info 1. BUYER Grain Merchandiser: Jeff Snyder, Phone 800-XXX-XXXX 
F. Seed Provider Info 1. SEED PROVIDER REP: Luke Avery, Phone 515-XXX-XXXX 
 
 
At this point, no studies have sought to investigate grower preferences for 
HOS program attributes so this thesis aims to fill this void.  Information detailing 
how grower’s weight attributes and a grower’s preferences of attribute levels would 
provide contract designers with relevant knowledge.  Furthermore, the thesis 
provides information about contract construction issues and directly encourages an 
optimal level of HOS adoption because transaction costs would be reduced if 
information is implemented appropriately by parties.   
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It is likely that less than 3% of soybean production acreage will be planted 
with HOS’s so the acreage planted to HOS varieties will be relatively small in 2014-
15. However, realizing a higher adoption level has been made a priority by the 
United Soybean Board which works with growers by investigating ways to increase 
value from production of soybeans.  The “checkoff” goal, as indicated by the United 
Soybean Board, is for 18-23 million planted acres (roughly 810 million bushels) of 
HOS to be planted by 2023 ("High Oleic Soy," 2013).   
F. Research questions and objectives 
 
These problems addressed in the previous section raise several important 
questions:  What attributes cause a decrease/increase in a grower’s willingness-to-
accept participation in a HOS segregation program?   At what levels should these 
attributes be presented to growers for a most efficient transaction and optimal 
adoption?  How is a grower’s willingness-to-accept participation in a HOS 
segregation program influenced if different choices and combinations of contract 
attributes are given?    How do growers value HOS program attributes?  What effect 
do various combinations of HOS contract attributes have on a farm business and 
decision making?   
These questions relate to adoption and best contract structuring issues. HOS 
segregation programs can be used to influence HOS production.  By critically 
assessing how growers react to terms found within program, stakeholders will 
benefit because insights allow for a healthier soybean oil to be diffused across 
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markets over time.  Furthermore, the analysis is important because much research 
expenditure has been put into developing HOS biotech varieties.  Pioneer-Dupont 
spent several decades researching and developing HOS varieties prior to when 
Plenish® HOS brand seeds entered markets ("Plenish high oleic soybeans helping 
recapture oil markets," 2013).  These costs will not be covered if growers do not 
participate in programs i.e. plant HOS varieties.   
The methodology used to address these questions is based on a choice 
experiment. There were five steps taken to construct and analyze the output of the 
choice experiment.  The first step was to decide on the program attributes and levels 
to include in the survey.  This was done through a review of the literature, by 
analyzing actual HOS segregation programs and through discussion with people 
informed about the topic.  The attributes decided upon were premium levels, 
delivery options, distance to buyer, HOS brand names and threshold tests.  The 
second step was to vary attribute levels across choice sets.  After the survey was 
finalized2 the third step was to e-mail the choice experiment to the subjects and wait 
for responses of the survey participants.  The fourth step was to create a database 
for use in an econometric model specifically coded for the study.  The fifth and final 
step was to analyze the output to begin filling the gap in the literature about best 
HOS program attribute level combinations. 
 
                                                          
2
 See Chapter 3 “Methodology” for a more thorough discussion of the experimental design.   
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2. Literature Review 
The literature review is focused on current and past research investigating 
participation in segregation programs and contract (program) construction 
problems.  Particular emphasis will be given to articles approaching these problems 
with the use discrete choice analysis to reveal grower preferences for different 
contract attributes.  Very few studies have been undertaken using choice analysis to 
analyze growers’ willingness-to-accept participation in a crop segregation program.  
A group of programs that have received attention are known as agri-environmental 
schemes (AES) of the European Union.  The conclusion draws from studies 
analyzing these programs are the most applicable with regards to the objective of 
this thesis. 
Relevant variables associated with segregation programs can be placed into 
one of two categories, which are farmer and program attributes.  Farmer attributes 
refer to demographic and farmographic variables. Past research investigates 
whether heterogeneities exist among growers or a farm business regarding 
preference for different contract attributes.   
The first two sections of the literature review are devoted to studies that 
researched farmer factors (demographics and farmographics) and the next two 
sections review studies that focused more on program attributes.  One of the 
sections related to program attributes explains how simulation has been used as a 
methodology to provide knowledge and the other section is devoted to choice 
analysis.  Discrete choice analysis is the method used in this research to draw 
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conclusions and therefore, the information presented in this section is most 
relevant.   
A. Demographics of Grower Participants in Programs  
 
Segregation programs where crops with biotech traits are transacted have 
only been around for several decades.  During this timeframe scholars have 
identified significant demographic variables of growers choosing to participate in a 
segregation program.  Knowing this information allows for a better understanding 
of which growers and markets to approach when trying to entice farmers to 
participate in segregation programs for biotech crops.   
Network effects and age have been identified as a set of significant 
demographic factors leading to the  adoption and diffusion of contracts by 
producers (James, Klein, & Sykuta, 2011).  Word-of-mouth and density of growers in 
a region are examples of network effect variables.  Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) 
conducted a survey in several regions with the object of identifying significant 
demographic factors influencing participation in a specific type of segregation 
program. Their findings suggest that the environmental attitudes of growers in a 
region influences willingness-to-accept participation in an agri-environmental 
scheme (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010).   
Age is another significant demographic variable explaining participation in a 
program where a segregated crop is transacted.  Older growers are less willing to 
sign a crop marketing contract (Bellemare, 2012).  With each additional year in age, 
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growers are approximately 2% less likely to participate in contract farming 
(Bellemare, 2012).   Gender, education level and years of farming experience have 
also been examined but the significance of these variables differs across studies 
(Ruto & Garrod, 2009).   
B. Farmographics of Grower Participants in Programs  
Significant farmographic variables explaining participation in a segregated 
crop program include farm size, farm debt, social characteristics of markets, and a 
regions asset base.  Larger farm sizes, in terms of net sales, are more likely to 
contract part of their production acreage (Bellemare, 2012; James, et al., 2011; 
MacDonald & Korb, 2008).  Large farms in the United States, those with at least $1 
million dollars in sales, used contracts nearly 70% of the time in 2008 (MacDonald 
& Korb, 2008).  Total production contracted for by these large farm businesses 
represented about 50% total production acreage in 2008.  Small farms in the United 
States, $250,000 or less in sales, utilized contracts in only 7% of cases and total 
small farm production under contract was 16% (MacDonald & Korb, 2008).  One of 
the reason why large farms are more likely to enter contractual agreement for their 
production relate to the fact that contracting does not favor small farms because 
larger fixed transaction and compliance costs are encountered by these firms 
(Ducos, Dupraz, & Bonnieux, 2009; Vavra, 2009).   
 The amount of debt a farm business has is another significant farmographic 
variable impacting growers’ decision to participate in segregation programs.  Grain 
and oilseed farm businesses using contracts, on average, have more debt per net 
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worth than farms not using contracts.  Farm businesses that contracted production 
acreage had an average debt of about 16% of net worth in 2008 (MacDonald & Korb, 
2008).  Farms that did not contract maintained about a 5% debt ratio (MacDonald & 
Korb, 2008). 
A regions asset base or institutional setting is another factor influencing 
growers willingness-to-participate in contract agriculture (Espinosa-Goded et al., 
2010).  Soil type is significant to a grower’s decision to plant a crop under contract.   
A grower will not plant HOS if the seed will not perform well on his/her land.  Also, a 
certain degree of asset specificity is realized for HOS transactions.  HOS batches 
must enter into a soybean crushing facility for large volumes of oil extraction.  
Proximity (distance) to a crushing facility also impacts a grower’s decision to 
participate in a segregation program.  If a grower normally delivers grain to a buyer 
10 miles away, but the only buyer of HOS’s is 35 miles away, opportunity costs may 
be high.  Previous literature has depicted this as an arbitrage criterion (Gloy & 
Dooley, 2003; Maltsbarger & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).   
C. Previous Studies Investigating Grower Response to 
Segregation Programs  
 
The previous literature has also identified program attributes related to 
agricultural segregation programs which impact the participation in these programs 
by growers and others across the supply chain.  Various methods have been utilized 
to determine the significance of these attributes. Simulation, choice analysis and 
case studies of segregation programs have been used to address contractual issues 
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closely related to this thesis.  Simulation has been used to evaluate best 
management practices for incorporating a new agbiotech crop trait, non-GMO grain 
or other identity preserved/segregated crop into corresponding supply chains.  
These studies examined how changing an attribute of a segregation program or a 
regional buyer’s asset configuration impact costs and efficiencies 
(Kalaitzandonakes, Maltsbarger, & Barnes, 2001; Lentz & Akridge, 1997; 
Maltsbarger, 1999; Maltsbarger & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001; Wilson, et al., 2008).    
The studies weigh tradeoffs and opportunity costs of different scenarios, 
which represent different volumes of segregated grain entering into different 
buyers asset configurations through various methods of delivery at differing times 
(Maltsbarger, 1999; Kalaitzandonakes & Maltsbarger, 2001).  Crop-to-bin 
assignments are also changed across scenarios and this allows for conclusions to be 
made related to best-management practices a buyer may undertake when 
participating in identity preserved/segregated crop supply transaction.  A main 
conclusion to come from these studies was that nearly all factors related to 
participation in a segregation program significantly impacted a buyers opportunity 
costs (Maltsbarger, 1999; Kalaitzandonakes & Maltsbarger, 2001).   
A significant finding relevant to this thesis is that scenarios using a harvest 
delivery option have lower coordination costs than those using the buyers call 
delivery option (Maltsbarger & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).  But buyers call scenarios 
result in lower opportunity costs for buyers.  Differences between the two delivery 
options are dependent on the parameters of each scenario; for example, the asset 
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configuration of a buyer or the quantity of identity preserved high oleic corn 
entering into facilities (Maltsbarger, 1999).  Because of this buyers must carefully 
weigh the decision to participate in a segregated crop system (Maltsbarger, 1999 
and Kalaitzandonakes & Maltsbarger, 2001).   
Previous studies have also used choice analysis to show how growers react 
to program attributes.  However, the number of these studies is limited and none 
have focused on the HOS segregation program.  Segregation programs (schemes) 
that have received attention are the agri-environmental schemes (AES) of the 
European Union (EU).   
D. Conclusions about Agri-Environmental Scheme (AES) 
Attributes Using Discrete Choice Analysis   
 
AES’s were included in the European Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), during the 1980s (Ducos, et al., 2009). These schemes are designed to 
prolong land quality (Ruto & Garrod, 2009) and participations to these programs 
are voluntary and vary.  In some schemes a grower agrees to plant a nitrogen fixing 
crop and in others land is idled.  Lack of participation in AES has been motivating 
most of these studies (Espinosa‐Goded, Barreiro‐Hurlé, & Ruto, 2010). 
Studies approaching program adoption and construction problems begin by 
identifying attributes of interest.  Attributes influencing participation in an AES are 
classified as farmer factors (demographics and farmographics) and scheme factors 
(attributes of AES) in previous literature (Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  Farmer factors are 
fixed and not much can be done to cause these to change (Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  
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Scheme factors are not fixed and policy makers for AES may alter these as new 
information becomes available (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010; Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  
Many AES studies have been conducted to uncover significant farmer factors 
influencing AES participation (Ducos, et al., 2009; Ruto & Garrod, 2009; 
Vanslembrouck, Huylenbroeck, & Verbeke, 2002).  Farm sizes, age of grower, 
education level and interest in the environment have been found to be significant 
farmer factors (Ducos, et al., 2009; Ruto & Garrod, 2009; Vanslembrouck, et al., 
2002).  Scheme factors i.e. program attributes which growers must follow upon 
participation in an AES are less researched by scholars interested in understanding 
what influences grower participation in AES (Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  Scheme factors 
of interest have included premiums, the length of agreement, flexibility of acreage 
devoted to a program, the extent of ex-ante contracting costs and other fixed and 
variable costs (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010; Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  Costs are 
exogenous program attributes because they cannot be explicitly stated like 
premium levels can in AES. 
There is much uncertainty amongst growers about AES’s (Christensen et al., 
2011; Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  Growers do not completely understand how 
participation in a scheme will influence their farm businesses profitability because 
costs are often misperceived (Christensen, et al., 2011; Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 
2010).  Also, there appears to be a lack of understanding in how and when 
premiums for participation would be received (Christensen, et al., 2011).  These are 
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both reasons why many growers would prefer to maintain current farm practices 
and choose to opt-out of a scheme (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).   
Conclusions about program construction problems found in an AES study can 
be used to investigate participation in the schemes by growers (Espinosa‐Goded, et 
al., 2010).  A programs length, flexibility, time to implement, additional payments 
(premiums) and amount of land to be devoted are all found to be statistically 
significant attributes (Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  Conclusions made across literatures 
about these attributes are similar and provide an understanding of a grower’s 
preference for certain program attributes and combinations of attributes.   
A main conclusion from AES studies about scheme factors is that higher 
premium payments increase a grower’s willingness-to-accept participation in 
schemes; however, growers are willing to trade off higher premium levels for other 
scheme attributes (Christensen, et al., 2011; Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010; Ruto & 
Garrod, 2009; Vanslembrouck, et al., 2002).  Christensen et al., (2011) conclude that 
“the vast majority of farmers (86%) are willing to trade off scheme requirements 
against the size of the subsidy.”  This is likely because the use of certain attributes 
and combinations of AES attributes result in lowered costs and more savings for 
growers (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  For example, growers are willing-to-accept 
participation for 24.6 €/ha less premium for schemes that do not require at least 
50% enrolment of eligible acreage (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).   Also, growers are 
willing-to-accept lower premiums when compulsory technical support and 
monitoring are given because this reduces the time she/he must devote to the 
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scheme  (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  Furthermore, growers would prefer to 
participate in a scheme that requires less paperwork (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010; 
Ruto & Garrod, 2009). 
Growers prefer contracts that are flexible and ones with many options 
(Christensen, et al., 2011; Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010; Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  
Flexibility and options allow growers to manage their business in a way they are 
used to doing - meaning less time and efforts will need to be undertaken.  Farmers 
weight or value attributes differently and demand more flexibility in certain 
attributes when compared with others (Christensen, et al., 2011).   Growers would 
prefer to have flexibility in the amount of land that must be entered into a scheme 
(Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  Furthermore, growers prefer having the option of 
choosing which section of their production acreage to devote to a scheme.  When a 
scheme requires growers to plant a crop which cattle may graze, growers would 
prefer to have the option of letting cattle graze the land.   
Certain scheme attributes are not preferred by growers, but policy makers 
can use combinations of attributes to entice participation.  Growers do not want to 
lock themselves into a scheme for many years and they will choose to opt out if they 
are constrained to participate for a long period of time (Christensen, et al., 2011; 
Ruto & Garrod, 2009).  However, an option growers value is the ability to opt out of 
a scheme prior to the ex-ante agreed upon length of an agreement (Christensen, et 
al., 2011).  Also, growers would prefer to opt-out and not participate in a scheme 
when attributes prohibit a farm manager’s ability to take certain actions on his/her 
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own land (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  Regardless, if policy makers feel attributes 
cannot be left out of a scheme higher premium levels may be used as incentive for 
growers to accept these terms (Espinosa-Goded, et al., 2010).  The continual 
modification of attributes may reduce transaction costs realized by parties and 
conclusions from AES choice analysis studies may be used by policy makers to 
determine optimal attribute levels and combinations (Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).   
E. The Gap in the Literature  
 
 The main discussion revolved around conclusions related to attributes 
contained in a program influencing a grower’s choice of participation in a program.  
Very few programs have been analyzed in this way, but the EU’s agri-environmental 
schemes have received attention.  This literature review provides further evidence 
that relevant conclusions can be drawn with choice experiments in like literature i.e. 
choice analysis studies providing information about AES attributes (Christensen, et 
al., 2011; Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010; Gallardo, Lusk, Holcomb, & Rayas-Duarte, 
2009).   
AES’s are agricultural segregation programs similar, yet different when 
compared to the HOS segregation program.  One difference is the length of these 
scheme agreements may be several years whereas in the HOS segregation program 
growers agree to participate for a growing season.  Another difference is that in 
AES’s there is a release-option i.e. growers may decide against participation in the 
scheme at some point during the original agreement term (Christensen, et al., 2011).  
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HOS segregation programs do not have this term; therefore, these conclusions 
cannot be taken from one program or scheme and applied directly to another.   
Every new program requires novel written material to fill a gap in the 
literature (Lentz & Akridge, 1997).  Because HOS segregation programs are new this 
thesis seeks to fulfill this objective using discrete choice analysis as the research 
methodology.  To the author’s knowledge, no choice experiment has analyzed 
grower preferences for HOS segregation program attributes most influential to a 
grower’s choice to participate in a program.  Furthermore, to the author’s 
knowledge, no literature has compared HOS program choice experiment results 
with actual HOS programs to provide recommendations.  
The following chapter describes the choice experiment implemented for this 
thesis. This allows to analyze the most responses attributes levels in terms of 
growers’ participation in a HOS segregation program.  After the methodology has 
been explained, results and conclusions will be discussed. 
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3. Methodology 
Agricultural economists were pioneers in the use of choice analysis 
(Unnevehr et al., 2010).  They were the first group of scholars to evaluate consumer 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for food and agricultural related goods and the first group 
of academics to use choice analysis  for explaining what attributes trigger a grower’s 
willingness-to-accept participation in a crop segregation program.  To produce 
these insights, revealed preference data from discrete choice surveys were coupled 
with theoretical economic models (Unnevehr, et al., 2010).   
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the experimental design of the 
choice experiment and explain how it was used to accomplish the main objective.  
The chapter articulates what a choice experiment is and how they are used to make 
observations about the preference behavior of growers for five attributes of HOS 
segregation programs - premium levels, delivery options and timeframe 
implications, distance to buyer, HOS brand name and purity threshold tests.   
A. Goods and attribute bundle 
 
Goods are a bundle of attributes that must be purchased as one unit 
(Unnevehr, et al., 2010).  For the purposes of this study, HOS segregation programs 
are considered goods.  Premium levels, delivery options, distance to buyer, 
threshold tests and brand name of HOS are attributes comprising a program.  Each 
attribute is individually ranked for importance by growers.  When deciding upon 
participation in a HOS program, an individuals’ choice is made by taking his/her 
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attribute level preferences into consideration.  Attribute comparisons are made 
across programs and a “utility or preference ordering” for a collection of attributes 
is created by growers (Lancaster, 1996).    
An estimated mean utility is a unit of measurement for the amount of 
happiness or satisfaction an average good provides an individual (Hensher, Rose, & 
Greene, 2005).  This mean utility is the sum of marginal utility estimates for 
individual attributes of the good.  When a set of alternative goods is presented to a 
rational being, the choice made will yield the most utility.  This behavioral 
framework is the theoretical conception of a choice experiment, which reveals 
preferences subjects have for combinations of attribute levels comprising goods 
(Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  
B. Experimental Design, Applied Choice Analysis 
 
A choice experiment was used for this thesis because  it place respondents in 
a hypothetical situation that closely mimic the real tradeoffs that growers would 
have to make when evaluating the attributes of contracts for different HOS 
programs.  The choice experiment contained four choice questions and a follow-up 
or nested acreage question.  Choice questions contained choice sets of three 
alternatives for survey subjects to choose between.  Two of the three alternatives 
represented HOS segregation programs with five attributes of varying levels and the 
third alternative served as an opt-out alternative.  Subjects chose just one 
alternative across each of the four choice sets.  If an individual marked preference 
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for a HOS contract pairing they were directed to an acreage question which asked 
respondents “how many acres would you devote to the HOS segregation program 
you selected?” Subjects had complete freedom in their marked answer.  Data from 
the nested acreage question was used to predict an average participant’s 
willingness-to-plant HOS varieties in number of acres.   
Two alternatives, within each choice set, were reflective of actual HOS 
segregation programs.  Data was collected from real programs as shown in Table 2.  
The column headings are used as classes to arrange the attribute found in HOS 
programs. Each row represents a collection of attribute levels comprising a 
program.  The types of decisions a grower participant must make can be explained 
by analyzing the information in the Table 2. For instance, a grower in northwestern 
Ohio may be within a reasonable distance of several buyers.  The Delphos, Ohio and 
Lima, Ohio buyers are separated by 15 miles of paved highway.  Growers deciding to 
transact with either of these buyers will be presented program attribute pairings 
differing, most notably, in the delivery timeframe.  Both delivery options are buyer’s 
call, but the Lima, Ohio delivery timeframe is anytime in December, 2014 and the 
timeframe for Delphos, Ohio is February – March 2015.  It is these types of attribute 
level differences across programs, which the experimental design mirrors.   
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Table 2 Data from 2014-15 HOS Segregation Program Contracts 
Location Company Premium Del 
Option 
Delivery 
Timeframe 
Months 
b/t Del 
Montpelier, OH Edon Farmers Coop $0.50/bu HD HD 0 
Delphos, OH Bunge  $0.50/bu; $0.40/bu BC; HD Feb-Mar 
2015 
2 
Bellevue, OH Bunge  $0.50/bu; $0.40/bu BC; HD Feb-July 
2015 
3 
Ottawa Lake, MI ADM $0.50/bu BC Feb-Mar 
2015 
2 
Logansport, IN ADM $0.40/bu Flex Del  Feb-Mar 
2015 
2 
Decatur, IN Bunge $0.50/bu; $0.40/bu BC; HD Feb-July 
2015 
7 
Salisbury, MD Perdue Farms $0.60/bu; $0.50/bu BC; HD Dec-Feb 
2015 
3 
Sidney, OH Cargill $0.50/bu BC Dec-Feb 
2015 
2 
Lima, OH Cargill $0.50/bu; $0.40/bu BC; HD Dec-14 1 
 
Best practices to develop the design for the choice experiment were followed.  
The design of the choice experiment should maximize orthogonality and balance 
(Lusk & Norwood, 2005).  Orthogonality is a test used to detect multicollinearity 
between independent variables.  The risk of failing this test can be reduced by 
deciding if a variable is strongly correlated with another before adding both into the 
design.  Balance relates to the idea of phrasing options in a way that would not 
promote a choice. 
An optimal survey is comprised of just as many questions needed to 
“maximize the statistical performance of coefficient estimates” (Lusk, Roosen, & Fox, 
2003).  However, the number of levels and contractual measures that we considered 
for this choice experiment were too large to present a full factorial design to 
respondents. Accordingly, we used the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) to produce 
31 
 
a balanced design with a reasonable number of choice sets.  One of the designs that 
deemed satisfactory consisted of 36 choice sets and yielded a D-efficiency of 86%. 
These sets were randomly apportioned to 9 blocks so each respondent was 
successively presented with 4 choice sets with two alternatives in each, plus the 
option to opt out. This third option allowed  for the experimental design to be 
consistent with demand theory (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001).   
Table 3 Simplified Choice Experiment Matrix 
 
Block 
I.D. 
 
Questions in 
Block 
HOS Contract 
Pairing 1 
HOS Contract 
Pairing 2 
Other Crop Options 
1. 4 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8 Other Seed Programs 
2 4 9, 10, 11, 12 13, 14, 15, 16 Other Seed Programs 
3. 4 17, 18, 19, 20 21, 22, 23, 24 Other Seed Programs 
4. 4 25, 26, 27, 28 29, 30, 31, 32 Other Seed Programs 
5. 4 33, 34, 35, 36 37, 38, 39, 40 Other Seed Programs 
6. 4 41, 42, 43, 44 45, 46, 47, 48 Other Seed Programs 
7. 4 49, 50, 51, 52 53, 54, 55, 56 Other Seed Programs 
8. 4 57, 58, 59, 60 61, 62, 63, 64 Other Seed Programs 
9. 4 65, 66, 67, 68 69, 70, 71, 72 Other Seed Programs 
 
The five included program attributes in the choice experiment were 
premium levels, delivery options – timeframe implications, distance to buyer, purity 
threshold tests and HOS brand names.  Each attribute had two or three levels.  An 
explanation of why levels were chosen is given in the following.   
 
 
32 
 
i. Premiums 
 
The choice experiment varied three levels of premiums across each of the 
HOS segregation program alternatives.  This was done to obtain the necessary 
amount of information about premium levels to express the willingness to pay of the 
other attributes in dollar terms.   The chosen levels were $0.25/bushel, 
$0.50/bushel and $0.75/bushel.  Researchers wanted to use $0.50/bushel as the 
middle number to reflect the data found in actual HOS segregation programs.  Of the 
nine 2014-15 programs (as shown in Table 2) found and analyzed, seven offered a 
$0.50/bushel level.  The $0.25/bushel increment around the $0.50/bushel was done 
taking into consideration premium values found in previous segregation programs 
and trends across programs.   
Furthermore, the method is in parallel with the double-bounded method of 
evaluating a consumers (producers) willingness-to-accept a change in an attributes 
level (Train, 2009).  When three levels are used the method is known as a triple-
bounded elicitation.  Either way is able to approximate a precise WTA or WTP value 
by weighing the tradeoffs producers undertake in the simulated choice experiment 
survey.  Each procedure may be used to “maximize a likelihood function” (Train, 
2009). The same logic was used in the construction of the distance to buyer 
attribute levels.   
Previous literature provides information about several trends of premium 
levels found in segregation programs.  The first trend is that premium levels reflect 
the few segregation cost estimates assigned in previous literature providing validity 
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to cost estimations (Kalaitzandonakes & Kaufman, 2010).  Put differently, premiums 
are designed to offset additional segregation costs and by summing cost estimates 
found in previous literature this has occurred across time and space.   
The second identified trend is that premium levels have been increasing over 
time.  Kalaitzandonakes & Kaufman (2010) detail increasing premium levels 
“expressed as percentages over the observed farm price of the commodity, 
premiums represented roughly 5%-15% increments over the 2001-2009 period.”  
Sykuta & Parcell (2003) analyzed nonGMO soybean contracts for the 1999 to 2002 
growing seasons.  The collection of contracts included 23 types of agricultural 
segregation programs and premium levels ranged from $0.10 per bushel to $0.30 
per bushel soybean.  Premium levels granted to growers who planted HOS varieties 
during the 2014-15 growing season ranged from $0.40 to $0.60 per bushel.  These 
premiums are more than premiums found in Sykutas and Parcells (2003), providing 
validity to the conclusion that premium levels have been increasing over time 
(Kalaitzandonakes & Kaufman, 2010).   
Higher premium levels will increase production of HOS varieties, but as the 
literature review  explained growers are willing-to-accept program participation for 
lower premium values when presented with more flexibility and options amongst 
other contract terms in a segregation program (Christensen, et al., 2011; Espinosa‐
Goded, et al., 2010).  This brings us to another significant HOS segregation program 
contract attribute the delivery option with timeframe implications.   
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ii. Delivery Options - Timeframe Implications 
 
Delivery options are used to reduce uncertainty buyers have of when in-
coming lots of a segregated crop will be delivered to facilities (Sykuta & Parcell, 
2003).  Harvest delivery (HD) provides grower flexibility with the timeframe to 
deliver his/her production to a buyer.  This will likely occur immediately after a 
harvest.  A buyers call (BC) delivery option forces growers to hold harvested grain 
in storage on their farms until a specified timeframe.  The grower will then be called 
by the buyer to deliver the harvest.  This will commonly be months after harvest (ex: 
Feb 1-Mar 31), but can extend up to a year (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003).  Higher 
premium values are generally granted for longer delivery windows/timeframes 
(Sykuta & Parcell, 2003). 
Sykuta & Parcell (2003) suggest that a grower’s willingness to participate in 
a segregation program is reduced when stated delivery timeframes are longer.  
Longer BC timeframes restrict a grower’s ability to strategically hedge the crops 
value (Sykuta & Parcell, 2003)and adds additional on-farm storage costs (Thakur & 
Hurburgh, 2009).  Sykuta & Parcell (2003) also note that the delivery window is not 
as influential to a grower’s preference of participation when compared to the first 
month of the BC timeframe.  Put differently, a delivery timeframe of Feb-March is 
likely preferred over March-April by growers.  The futures prices impact this 
preference; however. 
In HOS segregation programs the two types of delivery options are harvest 
delivery (HD) and buyers call (BC).  A BC delivery option is associated with a certain 
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delivery timeframe; for instance, (Feb 1-March 31).  The choice survey included 
three categorical attribute levels varied across alternatives.  These were HD, BC (Feb 
1-March 31) and BC (Feb 1-July 31).  Levels were representative of actual HOS 
segregation programs.  Researchers also wanted enough information to discuss 
implications of how growers view a BC timeframe starting in an identical month, but 
different in the windows length.   
iii. Distance to Buyer 
 
Distance to buyer is another continuous variable that were represented in 
the choice experiment with levels of 25 miles, 50 miles and 75 miles.  These 
numbers are representative of a reasonable distance growers would travel to 
deliver an identity preserved crop to a buyer.  Levels were varied across choice sets 
shown to soybean producers.   
Distance has been shown to be another attribute influencing the decision of 
which buyer a grower chooses to transact with (Gloy & Dooley, 2003; Maltsbarger, 
1999; Maltsbarger & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).  Assuming a constant fuel cost and a 
limited amount of time, growers that travel more miles to make a delivery will incur 
more costs than a grower travelling less miles to the elevator (Gloy & Dooley, 2003).  
Arbitrage opportunities depict a situation where a grower is confronted with a 
difficult decision of which grain elevator, of similar proximity, to deliver harvested 
crop.  Growers consider opportunity costs and at some distance growers will deliver 
to another buyer (Gloy & Dooley, 2003).   
36 
 
 Growers deliver grain to elevators within a reasonable proximity to the field 
they are harvesting.  An assumption that has been made is that an average grower 
will choose to deliver grain to the nearest buying facility.  However, this is not 
always the case because factors like loyalty and buyer basis impacts on cash price 
influence a grower’s decision making.  Grain elevators are in competition with other 
buyers in a grower’s general area.   They compete by offering favorable prices, while 
considering the facilities constraints and the local supply conditions (Gloy & Dooley, 
2003; Maltsbarger & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001).  Buyers offer the lowest possible 
price to attract the necessary quantity of a particular grain needed to most optimally 
utilize capacity (Gloy & Dooley, 2003).     
iv. Purity Thresholds Tests 
 
This attribute has two levels (test or no test) and researchers who designed 
the choice experiment varied these levels across HOS segregation program 
alternatives.  The attribute was included in the survey because it has been depicted 
as a significant attribute in previous literature.  Maintaining a segregated crop batch 
purity level should be a main priority of participants across a segregated supply 
chain. 
Detecting differences between grain batches of large quantities would be a 
challenging task to do visually and so test kits are used to maintain purity. These 
tests align consumer demand for specialty crop products with production practices 
by growers and others across the corresponding supply chain by detecting whether 
a purity threshold has been met.  A purity threshold is a standard, which segregated 
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crop batches must exceed to be considered that specific identity 
preserved/segregated crop (Kalaitzandonakes, et al., 2001).  Threshold levels vary 
across space and over time; for instance, batches of nonGMO soybeans may need to 
be 95% or 99.5% pure, depending on a buyers preferences or a nation’s policy 
(Kalaitzandonakes, et al., 2001).  For batches of oil to be considered high oleic, they 
must have an oleic acid content of greater than 73% and a linoleic acid content of 
less than 3% of the fatty acid composition.  Lower, or more strict, purity thresholds 
result in higher costs because growers must perform more task programmable 
steps to prevent contamination causing additional labor (time) and opportunity 
costs as an outcome (Kalaitzandonakes & Kaufman, 2010; Sykuta & Parcell, 2003).  
Also, even the most careful grower faces the risk of misreading and other 
uncontrollable factors (Gloy & Dooley, 2003).   
Although threshold tests are important to segregation programs, the crop 
type impacts the amount of preventive measures that must be undertaken to ensure 
batch purity.  Soybeans are self-pollinating, meaning cross-pollination is unlikely to 
occur.  Assuming cross-pollination does not occur; purity may only be reduced if 
volunteer crops, unclean equipment or uncontrollable factors and events transpire.   
v. Brand Names 
 
Branding is a dynamic tool used to signal a products credibility, quality and 
risks consumers undertake when purchasing a good (Ubilava, Foster, Lusk, & 
Nilsson, 2011).  Consumers are known to make purchasing decisions because of 
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brand names.  However, across groups of products, brand names are viewed by 
consumers differently.   
The corn and soybean agbiotech seed sector has been characterized by 
several trends.  These trends are important when discussing the brand names found 
within the sector.  One trend is that a few agbiotech seed firms own an increasing 
proportion of the market share for corn and soybeans, but the number of 
independent players remains many (Wilson & Dahl, 2010).  The sector is classified 
as having many licenses across companies, which may be thought of as the practice 
of working and cooperating with vertical and horizontal players. Growers have 
many different seed options and a conclusion, using data from 2008, is that in a 
majority of crop reporting districts (CRD) growers purchased corn and soybean 
seeds from 4-7 different companies and up to 20 or more companies in large CRDs 
(Wilson & Dahl, 2010).  This indicates that growers do not purchase soybean seeds 
based exclusively on brand names.   
The HOS brand name attribute was another category coded to avoid the 
dummy variable trap.  The no-brand option was the attribute level used as a 
baseline for interpretation.  The BC (Feb:March) and BC (Feb:July) delivery options 
were included in the coded econometric specifications.  A further analysis is given in 
the following section.   
C. The Database  
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The dependent variable (LHS) for choice experiment econometric models is a 
grower’s choice or preference of alternative.  Each alternative in a choice set was 
coded into in a Microsoft Excel database.  The chosen alternative is represented by a 
– 1 - and the other two non-chosen alternatives are represented by – 2 - (Allison, 
1999). So, assuming each respondent completed the survey entirely she/he was 
associated with 12 rows of the final database.  The next step was to enter in the 
independent variables.  All attribute level combinations comprising alternatives 
across the four choice sets presented to subjects are the independent variables in 
the database. 
Qualitative data is related with categorical attribute levels; such as, the 
threshold attribute.  Upon entering qualitative data with two levels into a 
spreadsheet, responses should be operationalized as (0, 1).  For an attribute having 
more than two levels (ex: HD, BC-Feb:March or BC-Feb:July), a data entry procedure 
must be undertaken to avoid the dummy variable trap.  Program attributes, 
monetary in nature (premiums), or unit based (distance to buyer) were coded as 
continuous variables.  Premium levels were entered into the spreadsheet as (0, 
$0.25, $0.50, or $0.75 per bushel) and distance levels were coded as (0, 25, 50, or 75 
miles). This allowed for an interpretation to be stated using a specific baseline like 
per dollar or per mile, respectively.   
The completely coded Microsoft Excel® database had 6,756 observations 
(rows) and 8 columns.  The database was used within an econometric specification 
and maximum likelihood parameter estimates were outputted.  These estimates 
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were coupled with the following multinomial logit model and willingness-to-accept 
measurement functions to form conclusions.   
D. Grower Preference and Behavior Choice Estimation Model 
The theory underpinning the choice experiments is based on the random 
utility theory.  When applied to choices made between contracts this theory 
assumes that growers will derive disutility from the assortment of various contract 
terms or specifications if these constrain them in their action or force them to incur 
expenses to meet the contractual terms. Assuming the utility of growers is additive, 
the utility which they derive from accepting a contract can then be represented with 
a random utility function of the type:  
Uj = ∑ βmxmj + βa
M
m=1 Aj + εj                                                     (1) 
where M is the number of different contract terms in the contract, xmj, is the value 
taken by contractual term m for a contract of type  j and βm is the (negative) utility 
weight, also called part-worth, associated with contract terms m (Lusk & Norwood, 
2005; Hensher, et al., 2005). Aj is the payment offered to growers to accept the 
contract of type j so βa corresponds to the marginal utility of income which is 
assumed to be constant for this specification. 
 εj is an error term which is added to the deterministic portion of the utility 
to represent unobserved random influences that affect the utility of each grower. 
The error term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed and 
follow a type I distribution. This utility formulation has been used with variation 
across choice analysis studies to form conclusions (Christensen et al., 2011; 
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Espinosa‐Goded, Barreiro‐Hurlé, & Ruto, 2010; Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005; Ruto 
& Garrod, 2009).   
E. Multinomial logit model  
An appropriate statistical framework needs to be used to estimate the utility 
parameters, βm and βA, in (Error! Reference source not found.) because each choice 
ecision depends on the values taken by the error terms in (Error! Reference source not 
found.) and are therefore probabilistic in nature. The probability that product j is 
chosen over alternative i can be expressed as: 
Pj = Prob[ Uj > Ui]                  (2) 
Equation (1) represents a binary choice relationship between only two 
contract alternatives but in most choice experiments the choice set contains M 
alternatives. In this case the parameters of the utility function can be estimated with 
a variant of the multinomial logit model. 
 Based on the assumption made on the error term of the random utility 
function (1), the probabilities of choosing contract alternative j can then be 
expressed as a function of all the other alternatives in the choice set: 
Pj =
exp[  𝛃 𝐱𝐣]
∑ exp[  𝛃 𝐱𝐦]
M
m=1
 
(3) 
 
where 𝛃 𝐱𝐣 = ∑ βmxmj + βP
M
m=1 Pj as in function (1). 
This choice framework connects the grower preference model (1) with the 
multinomial logit model, coded into SAS, which reads in the database of 
observations from the researcher created choice experiment.  A grower’s utility 
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cannot be directly observed, so a latent variable representing the grower’s utility 
must be used as the dependent variable in the multinomial logit model to conform 
to the layout of the grower preference model (1).  Simply put, by using the empirical 
data, utility is inferred through the choice or marked preference of each grower.   
F. Monetary Willingness-to-Accept Measurement 
 
Choice experiments have been used to produce willingness-to-accept (WTA) 
values and willingness-to-pay (WTP) values (Hensher, et al., 2005; Unnevehr, et al., 
2010).  Choice experiment studies where food consumers are subjects rather than 
producers have been more frequently undertaken.  These studies have analyzed 
consumer preferences for like food products with different attribute levels e.g. 
branded vs. unbranded pork (Gallardo, et al., 2009; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004; 
Ubilava, et al., 2011).  Results can be used to explain the influence attribute levels 
have on demand for a particular food good.  A consumer’s WTP for value added 
product quality attributes is calculated in these studies (Loureiro & Umberger, 
2007; Lusk, et al., 2003; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004; Tonsor, Schroeder, & Lusk, 2013).   
Previous literatures where a grower’s preferences for agricultural 
segregation program attributes are analyzed seem to use either WTP or WTA.  To do 
this, perspective must first be given.  If a WTP value is estimated the study will detail 
how a change in an attribute level (ex: HD-BC delivery option) influences a growers 
WTP for the good (Alvarez-Farizo, 1999).  Interpretation of a WTP value is that it is 
the monetary amount consumers would be willing-to-pay for a certain attribute.  
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When a WTA function is used, interpretation is the additional value growers would 
need to accept participation in a program because of a change in an attribute level 
(Espinosa‐Goded, et al., 2010).  This thesis makes the assumption that functions 
stated in previous literature estimating a WTP value can be used for estimating a 
WTA value.   
Each, β, in function (1) represents an average grower’s marginal utility or 
disutility received from an attribute of interest.  By coupling maximum likelihood 
parameter estimates with function (1) a mean or expected willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) participation value may be found for an alternative with a particular set of 
attribute levels.  This value will have units of utility (Ubilava, et al., 2011).  By using 
the formula specified in equation (4), parameter estimates can be used to estimate 
the amount of money an individual would be willing to forego in order to be 
indifferent to a one unit change in an attributes level, i.e. a growers willingness-to-
accept in; for example, a program having a BC (Feb-March) delivery option rather 
than a harvest delivery option (Gallardo, et al., 2009). 
WTA attribute=
price
nattribute

 )(
                                                                                                                (4) 
A parameter estimate in monetary units 
price  is used in the denominator of 
function (4).  The numerator of this function
)(nattribute  is the negative of a parameter 
estimate that is not in monetary units.  This attribute may then be interpreted in 
terms of price.         
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G. Summary  
 
The choice experiment reflected random utility theory, which views an 
individual as a rational being striving to maximize his/her own utility (Hensher and 
el. al, 2009).  The experiment “allows for multi-attribute valuation and permits the 
measurement of trade-offs among numerous attributes,” (Lusk, et al., 2003).  The 
revealed preference data was used to produce maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates.  These estimates are interpreted as marginal utility weights.  Estimates 
can be used in WTA measurement to find values with units of dollars/bushel.  The 
acreage data of the nested survey questions was interpreted as a measurement of 
willingness-to-plant HOS in number of acres.  The following chapter details the 
results of the experiment.    
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4. Results 
 
 Providing information resulting from the choice experiment is the focus of 
this chapter.  The first section describes the response rate.  The second section 
provides interpretations of revealed preference data of each choice question.  
Interpretation of maximum likelihood parameter estimates and monetary 
willingness-to-accept values allows for explanation of the program attribute level 
combinations most preferable to growers.  Comparisons between actual HOS 
programs and the data collected from the choice experiment are used to make 
recommendations that could be used to improve the contractual arrangement 
between growers and buyers of HOS.  The third section estimates an average grower 
participant’s willingness-to-plant HOS varieties.  Final remarks are made.    
A. Response Rate of the Choice Experiment  
 
The response rate of the survey was more than adequate to obtain 
statistically relevant results.  All 915 of the surveys subjects were growers.  299 of 
the subjects did not complete any survey question, so 616 (67%) subjects 
completed part of the survey.  However, 53 (6%) of these people did not complete 
the choice experiment entirely or correctly.  For instance, some individuals decided 
to complete the choice questions only.   
There were 297 (48%) respondents to the choice questions that had mixed 
preferences across choice sets with two participation alternatives and one non-
participation alternative.  This indicates that different attribute level combinations 
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comprising HOS segregation programs are significant to a grower’s choice of 
participation and that certain attribute pairings are preferred over others.  The 
remaining 319 (52%) respondents preferred complete participation or non-
participation across the four choice questions.  204 (33%) respondents marked 
complete non-participation and 115 (18.6%) respondents preferred a participation 
alternative across all four choice questions.  This is indicative of the fact that many 
growers show strong preference for maintaining current farm management 
practices (Espinosa-Goded et. al, 2011).   
B. Choice questions  
 
 Table (4) was part of the model output and it shows the overall model had a 
high degree of statistical significance.  This is further evidence that HOS segregation 
programs have influence upon an average grower’s willingness-to-accept 
participation in a program. 
Table 4 Overall Model Significance 
 
 
 
Table (5) contains the maximum likelihood parameter estimates. Parameters 
estimated were transformed into WTA values in monetary units. A description of 
each attribute is given below the matrix.  Not all attributes are shown to be 
statistically significant, as both brand name parameter estimates (Plenish® and 
Test Pr>ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio <.0001 
Score <.0001 
Wald <.0001 
47 
 
Vistive Gold®) and the threshold estimate do not pass significance tests.  These 
attributes have very little or no influence over an average grower’s willingness-to-
accept (WTA) participation in a program.  However, the three other estimates are 
highly significant at all commonly checked significance levels (.1, .05, and .01).  
These significant attributes are premiums, the delivery option and distance-to-
buyer.   
Unless more buyers accept participation in a HOS segregation program an 
agricultural field’s proximity to a participating buyer of HOS’s will not change.  To 
provide relevant information the discussion will continue by emphasizing the main 
effects of premium levels and delivery options.  Also, WTA estimates with units of 
dollars per bushel allow for explanation of how delivery option levels influence 
premium levels.  
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Table 5 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Attribute Parameter 
Estimate 
WTA estimate 
(units=$/bushel) 
Pr>ChiSq 
1. PREMIUM 3.47790  <.0001*** 
2. DELIVERY OPTIONS    
A. BC (Feb:March) -0.39066 0.112 <.0001*** 
B. BC (Feb:July) -0.45942 0.132 <.0001*** 
3. DISTANCE -0.00899 0.003 <.0001*** 
4. HOS BRAND NAMES    
A. Plenish® .04064 -0.011 .6535 
B. Vistive Gold® -.12254 0.035 .1820 
5. Threshold -.02123 0.006 .7652 
INT 2.20286  <.0001*** 
  Description of the program (contract) attributes and description and interpretation of INT.: 
1. Premium: Continue variable where units=dollars.  ***Significant at all checked levels.  
2. BC (Feb:March): Buyers Call delivery option with 2 month timeframe.  This variable was 
created to avoid the dummy variable trap. ***Significant at all checked levels. 
3. BC (Feb:July): Buyers Call delivery option with 6 month timeframe.  This variable was 
created to avoid the dummy variable trap. ***Significant at all checked levels. 
4. DISTANCE: Continuous variable where units=miles. ***Significant at all checked levels. 
5. Plenish®: Brand name line-up of Pioneer-Dupont HOS varieties.  This variable was created 
to avoid the dummy variable trap.  Non-branded HOS was attribute level excluded from 
model.  Not significant. 
6. Vistive Gold®: Brand name line-up of Monsanto Company’s HOS varieties.  This variable was 
created to avoid the dummy variable trap.  Non-branded HOS was attribute level excluded 
from model.  Not significant. 
7. Threshold: Binary (dummy) variable where (1) = test. Not significant. 
8. INT: Binary coded where (1) = non-participation alternative. Interpretation of this attribute 
is that it is the utility an average grower receives from opting out.  ***Significant at all 
checked levels.   
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i. Interpretation of Results from the choice experiment: An 
Ordered System.   
 
Because this research used choice experiment data the parameter estimates 
are interpreted using marginal utility to explain a change in choice (the dependent 
variable) rather than log-odds.  Also, “the overall scale of utility is irrelevant” (Train, 
2009).  For this reason, results of the choice experiment are used to weight 
preferences of contract attributes comprising HOS segregation programs.  Put 
differently, certain program attributes are more valued by an average grower and 
the parameter estimates can be used to identify which are of more importance to 
growers.   
1. Premium  
 
A grower participants’ overall utility is positively impacted by larger 
premium levels.  Results show that premiums are significant and influence a 
grower’s willingness-to-accept participation in a HOS segregation program.  The 
premium attribute is interpreted as marginal utility of income against which all the 
other parameters can be compared against.  Compared to all other HOS segregation 
program attributes of interest premium levels may most effectively be used to 
influence production of HOS’s.  One conclusion is that growers seem to be willing-to-
accept participation in a program with lower premium levels when certain other 
program attributes are presented in contracts. In particular, the growers would 
prefer to have a high amount of flexibility in the delivery option and timeframe.   
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2.  Delivery Options - Timeframe Implications.  
 
  Growers are sensitive to changes in the type of delivery option used in a 
program.  The delivery option - timeframe attribute has statistical significance at all 
commonly checked confidence levels.  In the choice experiment sent to growers, 
three attribute levels were varied across choice sets.  Because of this the harvest 
delivery (HD) option was excluded from the database to avoid the dummy variable 
trap.  This attribute level is used as a baseline for interpretation.   
The BC (Feb:March) estimate means a grower’s utility will be 0.39066 less if 
this BC option rather than when a HD option is used.  The monetary WTA estimate 
of 0.112 can be interpreted as growers are willing-to-accept is $0.112 less of a 
premium per bushel if given the HD option instead of a BC (Feb:March) delivery 
option.  Furthermore, the BC (Feb:July) estimate means the overall utility a grower 
receives from participation would be 0.45942 less when this option is stated in a 
contract rather than the HD option.  The WTA estimate concludes that growers are 
willing-to-accept $0.132 less of a premium when given the HD option rather than 
the BC (Feb:July) delivery option.   
By comparing the monetary WTA estimates for the two BC delivery options 
conclusions can be made about preferences of delivery windows and timeframes.  
Consider that Feb-March is a two month delivery window and Feb-July is a seven 
month delivery window, the difference being about five months.  The difference 
between the BC (Feb:March) and BC (Feb:July) attribute estimates is $0.02/bushel.  
This shows that for each additional month of the five months, growers require less 
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than $0.005 more to be willing to accept participation in the program.  This further 
proves that growers would prefer to have the opportunity to make delivery in a 
timeframe close to or immediately after harvest, assuming a fixed premium level.  
Further research is needed to understand a grower’s preference for a BC delivery 
option with a timeframe window of; for example, (Dec-Feb) versus one with a 
(Feb:July) timeframe.  Cash prices fluctuate across time and space but some month 
blocks of the futures market are historically better for growers to sell in than others 
and informed grower members have this knowledge.   
The main takeaway is that the harvest delivery option is an average grower’s 
most preferred delivery option.  Growers are more willing-to-accept participation in 
a HOS program with this delivery option rather than a BC option.  However, if 
decision makers decide a BC delivery option must be included in a program higher 
premium levels may be used as incentive for growers to be more willing-to-accept 
this trade-off.   
3. Distance 
 
Distance to buyer is the only other significant HOS segregation program 
attribute.  The attribute is a continuous variable with units of miles.  Interpretation 
is that for each additional mile to buyer the utility level realized by a grower will 
decrease by 0.00899.  The monetary WTA estimate predicts the growers require 
$0.003 per bushel for each additional mile travelled to be willing-to-transact HOS 
varieties with a participating buyer.  In a scenario where a participating grower 
would deliver harvested HOS batches to a buyer he normally transacts with 
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opportunity costs are low.  When this is not true, opportunity costs are high, in the 
growers mind, or about $3.00 for each additional mile a HOS load travels. 
Although this is small value per bushel, a conclusion that can be made is that 
at a certain distance to buyer, growers will not be willing-to-accept participation in 
a program if their typical buyer from field X is not participating (Gloy & Dooley, 
2003).  A grower’s overall utility and net income per bushel are reduced when she 
or he must undertake additional time and distance to deliver a harvested HOS crop.  
Arbitrage situations are considered by growers.  Also, there is a limited number of 
participating buyers and many of these buyers are located in Ohio.  About thirty of 
the fifty United States produced soybeans in 2014-15, but less than five had HOS 
varieties planted.  Distance to participating buyer is an attribute that significantly 
influences the production of HOS varieties.     
4. Brand Name 
 
The non-significance of both brand name attributes is evidence that growers 
are increasingly not influenced to plant a seed because of its brand name.  Findings 
suggest that the overall utility of an average grower’s decision to market his/her 
grain is not significantly influenced because of the brand name HOS planted.  The 
purpose of this research is not to investigate potential reasons to explain this 
finding, but several are given. 
One explanation may be that the seed industry has realized a lot of change 
over the past several decades.  Many large firms have vertically integrated or 
contracted with other firms making it difficult to know for certain that a brand is 
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what it used to be and not altered in some way (Wilson & Dahl, 2010).  The industry 
is characterized by licensing agreements across companies and traits found within 
one seed brand may actually be owned by other companies and, often times, these 
traits are branded.  Secondly, seed salesmen are in competition with one another 
and growers routinely purchase from many of these actors. 
5. Threshold 
 
The threshold attribute is a binary variable that represents the possibility of 
a purity threshold test.  This attribute estimate is found to be not significant in a 
grower’s choice of participation in a HOS segregation program.  Soybeans are self-
pollinating plants, so the odds of cross pollination are low.  Basically the only way 
comingling may occur is through contamination because of unclean equipment or 
storage facilities, volunteer crops, misreading tests or purchased bags of seed that 
were not originally pure.  The average grower participant is likely to understand 
this and take precautionary measures to prevent these events from occurring.  
Grower participants associate a low amount of risk to failure of a HOS threshold test.  
Another likely explanation is that very few threshold tests are applied by an 
intermediary buyer on batches of grain delivered from a grower.  Further research 
is needed in this arena. 
ii. Comparing Choice Survey Results with Actual Programs  
 
Results indicate that the premium, the delivery option (timeframe) and 
distance to buyer were significant program attributes influencing a grower’s 
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willingness-to-accept participation in a HOS program.   As indicated by Table 6 the 
premium levels included in 2014-15 HOS segregation programs were $0.40, $0.50 
or $0.60/bushel.   These levels are dependent on the delivery option (timeframe) a 
grower chooses.  The actual programs are flexible and provide the grower with 
options, but three recommendations are given as ways to improve the efficiency of 
the program and corresponding transaction. These recommendations are made 
based on the findings of the research.   
One recommendation would be to critically assess current premium levels 
based on HOS production levels and either maintain premium levels or make 
adjustments.  Buyers need to consider their own situation and make decisions based 
on metrics which identify the proportion of regular customers to their facility that 
participated in the program. If an acceptable level of growers (located around 
participating buyers) participated in the program then the main problem may not 
be grower participation, but buyer participation.  The significant distance to buyer 
attribute is evidence that buyer participation is a problem because a field’s 
proximity to participating buyer is fixed and growers would prefer additional 
compensation of about $3.00 per bushel for additional mileage where typical buyer 
is the baseline.  Program designers may want to change the average premium levels 
granted by a buyer from a current mode level of $0.40-$0.50/bushel.  Thus, more 
buyers would be willing-to-accept participation in programs and the influence of the 
significant distance constraint on HOS adoption would be reduced.   
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Table 6 Data from 2014-15 HOS Segregation Program Contracts (2)                                             
Location Company Premium Del 
Option 
Delivery 
Timeframe 
Mths 
b/t Del 
Montpelier, Oh Edon Farmers 
Coop 
$.5/bu HD HD 0 
Delphos, Oh Bunge  $.5/bu; $.4/bu BC; HD Feb-Mar 2015 2 
Bellevue, Oh Bunge  $.5/bu; $.4/bu BC; HD Feb-July 2015 7 
Ottawa Lake, MI ADM $.5/bu BC Feb-Mar 2015 2 
Logansport, IN ADM $.4/bu Flex Del  Feb-Mar 2015 2 
Decatur, IN Bunge $.5/bu; $.4/bu BC; HD Feb-July 2015 7 
Salisbury, MD Perdue Farms $.6/bu; $.5/bu BC; HD Dec-Feb 2015 3 
Sidney, OH Cargill $.5/bu BC Dec-Feb 2015 2 
Lima, OH Cargill $.5/bu; $.4/bu BC; HD Dec-14 1 
 
 
 A second recommendation is to experiment with a $0.15 per bushel premium 
for choosing a certain BC (timeframe) over HD.  The study finds that growers are 
WTA participation for $-0.112/bushel or $-0.132/bushel when a BC (Feb:Mar) or BC 
(Feb:July), are used, respectively, rather than a HD option.  In five of the nine 
collected 2014-15 HOS programs growers were given the option of either HD or BC 
(timeframe).  If growers were to choose a BC delivery option then they must be 
willing-to-accept $0.10 per bushel less than when choosing a HD option.   
 Current program designs allowing growers to choose between several 
delivery options is a great way to promote adoption; however, it appears that 
contract designers prefer to state premium levels that are multiples of ten.  The 
reasoning is likely very logical i.e. fewer accounting errors, but one suggestion 
would be to experiment with values that are multiples of five like $0.15 per bushel 
premium.  A larger difference between BC (timeframe) and HD would allow buyers a 
greater ability to move other crops in and out of facilities before integrating HOS 
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batches as more growers would be willing-to-accept participation in a program 
which includes a buyer’s call delivery option.   
A third recommendation is for participating buyers to start planning to 
incorporate HOS varieties early and make periodical evaluations for a most efficient 
outcome. If both delivery options are available to growers then it can be expected 
that batches of HOS’s will enter into facilities shortly after harvest and during the BC 
timeframe.  This means those bins will need to be assigned as HOS over that entire 
duration to prevent co-mingling.  Buyers should critically assess price levels and 
delivery options as the opportunity cost of underutilized storage capacity is high 
(Maltsbarger, 1999; Kalaitzandonakes & Maltsbarger, 2001).  The timeframe of 
stated delivery option coupled with the futures market pricing periods is very 
important to this discussion.  Premium levels have been fixed in programs but the 
stated monthly or two-monthly periods of future prices fluctuate historically and 
trends have been shown to occur.  Further research is needed to acquire more 
understanding of this aspect of the program construction problem.  Contingencies 
could be stated based on the final call agreement in a BC (timeframe) option, for 
instance. 
iii. Main Findings of the Choice Experiment 
 
The study’s findings are useful for HOS segregation program developers, 
agricultural supply agreement negotiators (crop marketing consultant or crop 
broker), academics, the growers and the buyers.  The findings are grouped into one 
of two main types of conclusions.  One type of conclusion discusses the main effects 
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of premiums, delivery options and distance-to-buyer.  The second type of conclusion 
details the interaction between premium levels and the delivery options, using WTA 
estimates.  The conclusions can be applied to the program construction and 
adoptions problems (questions) which guided the discussion.   Transaction costs 
would be lowered and higher adoption of HOS varieties would be realized if the 
main findings are implemented by stakeholders.   
The main effect of each significant attribute will be ranked or weighed by 
individual growers differently.  But, the results of the study show that an average 
grower will be most influenced by the premium level, the delivery option and 
distance-to-buyer respectively.  Higher premiums will result in more grower 
participation in a HOS program.  When compared with a BC delivery option, the HD 
option will provide a grower with more utility.  A longer distance-to-buyer will 
reduce a grower’s overall utility received from participation in a program.  The 
significant distance-to-buyer attribute indicates that both grower and buyer 
participation is needed.  A greater amount of strategically located capacity dedicated 
to receiving batches of HOS would reduce the attributes influence.  Results from 
previous studies focused on buyer participation in programs should be used in 
parallel with conclusions made in this research and more research, from both 
perspectives, would be useful.   
The interaction between premium levels and delivery options was 
addressed. Growers are willing-to-accept about $0.12 per bushel less of a premium 
level when a HD option rather than either a BC (Feb:Mar) or BC (Feb:July) option is 
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included in a program. Although a similar difference is already found within HOS 
programs, a recommendation is for program designers to experiment with a larger 
than $0.12 per bushel premium.  This would give incentive for growers to accept 
participation in a program with a BC option.  The BC option is valued by buyers 
because it allows more flexibility in elevator management practices.  Regardless, 
both the growers and the buyers should critically access the delivery options and 
premium levels and choose the option best for their situation.   
C. Acreage questions  
Data received were used to estimate or predict the number of HOS acres an 
average grower participant would be willing-to-plant with HOS varieties.  Many 
respondents marked different acreage levels across the four questions causing some 
complexity in the best way to predict an average grower participant’s willingness-
to-plant HOS’s in number of acres.  Multiple ways were used to make this prediction, 
but the following was found to be the best representation of the data.   
 A two-step procedure was used to predict that an average grower participant 
would be willing-to-plant on average (197.55) acres of HOS’s.  The first step of the 
procedure was a formula which found the average number of acres a grower 
participant would be willing-to-plant with HOS varieties.  If a grower respondent 
marked (200) acres for (1/4) of the acreage questions that he was presented, (100) 
acres for another nested acreage question and (0) acres for the remaining two 
acreage questions, the formula would depict this grower as being willing-to-plant 
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(150) acres of HOS’s.  (197.55) is the average across all the respondents using this 
technique.   
 This value and certain intervals around it may be used to estimate other 
values like the number of growers needed to achieve the United Soybean Board’s 
checkoff goal of 18 million planted acres of HOS by 2023.  To achieve this goal about 
91,117 growers would need to participate in the program.  The information 
provided in this document is designed to be a knowledge source to make this 
happen.    
D. Final Remarks 
 
The HOS segregation program contains attributes which facilitate the supply 
of pure HOS batches from a grower’s field to a soybean processing (crushing) 
facility.  These attributes allocate value, decision rights and property rights (Sykuta 
& Parcell, 2003).  Attributes are of various levels and the purpose of this project was 
to provide information about grower preferences for certain HOS program attribute 
level pairings.  By providing knowledge about how best to construct a program, 
higher adoption levels of HOS’s may be more easily attained.  This research was a 
first to approach these problems. 
The choice experiment simulated the decision making process undertaken by 
a soybean farmer in a HOS segregation program.  Results show that the premium 
level, the delivery option and the distance to buyer are significant to a grower’s 
willingness-to-accept participation in a HOS segregation program.  The growers 
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consider premium levels as the most important attribute comprising a program and 
growers are willing-to-accept participation in a program for about $0.12/bushel less 
if a harvest delivery option rather than a buyer’s call deliver option is given.  The 
significance of the distance-to-buyer attribute indicates that more research is 
needed to analyze the best management techniques a buyer should undertake when 
incorporating a batch of HOS’s.   
Final recommendations have been given to stakeholders.  The current 
programs have many options available to growers and current premium levels 
should more than exceed additional segregation costs incurred due to participation.  
Growers should be willing-to-plant HOS for lower premium levels so that more 
buyers would be willing-to-accept participation in a program.  Higher production 
levels of HOS’s would be achieved as growers would be able to transact with their 
typical HOS buyer.   
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